We use a unique dataset to assess whether IPOs where insiders change their holdings have different long-term returns. We find that IPOs where insiders are net sellers are more likely to generate positive long-run returns, while those where they are net buyers underperform. The analysis of individual trades shows that insiders sell when their IPO reaches its optimal value as the excess returns are positive in the pre-event and not significant in the post-event period.
Introduction
Previous studies show that IPOs generate no or negative excess returns in the long run. This relatively low performance emanates from a combination of extreme differences of opinion among investors, costly short selling, and small public floats on many IPOs.
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In this paper, we contribute to this extensive literature by assessing the characteristics of IPOs in which insiders, defined as board members, are net buyers and net sellers, and whether their trades are related to the long-run performance of IPOs. We address the following questions: Do
IPOs in which insiders are net sellers underperform relative to those in which they are net buyers? If so, does this difference in performance occur before or after their trades, and therefore, do insiders trade to respond to their IPOs' past performance or to signal future stock price performance? We construct a unique hand-collected dataset of 830 UK IPOs containing all information from prospectuses and insider trading events, and we use relevant accounting and stock price data, three-years after the IPO date, to answer these questions.
Studies on insider trading show that aggregate insider trading activity significantly predicts future market returns, because insiders are likely to trade on private information and to know better the true value of their firm than outside investors (e.g., Seyhun, 1998) . For example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) form portfolios based on the net purchase ratio, NPR, defined as insider net purchases over total transactions, and find that insider purchases, not sells, are more likely to predict future stock returns, and insider trading informativeness is more pronounced in smaller firms. In this paper we focus on the impact of NPR on the longrun performance of IPOs. First, we compute the 36-months returns for each of our IPOs, and then assess whether IPOs where insiders are net buyers (sellers) over this sample period generate positive (negative) returns. We then analyse individual trades to assess whether this excess performance explains or is driven by insider trading.
In line with previous evidence on insider trading, we expect insiders to be contrarians by buying shares if their IPO is underperforming, and selling if it is over-performing. On the announcement date and post-trade period, share prices will increase for the buy and decrease for the sell trades. Such results will be consistent with the proposition that insiders trade on private information that may emanate from their assessment of the true value of their firm, or subsequent news releases. This will imply that insiders reduce the IPOs' inherent information asymmetries, and, thus, their trades will affect the short-and long-run returns of their firm.
We find contrasting results to our expectations as IPOs where insiders are net sellers (Net Sell) generate positive returns, while those where they are net buyers (Net Buy) underperform substantially throughout the 36-months post-IPO period. We find similar results using the style-adjusted, equal and value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns, and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Our regression results provide further support for these results, as the coefficient of NPR, defined in terms of trading volume or value, is negative and significant, suggesting that Net Sell (Net Buy) IPOs generate positive (negative) long-run returns, even after accounting for all the IPOs' fundamental factors.
We investigate further the causality of our results, the drivers of this asymmetric performance, the timing ability of insiders, and the information content of insider trading, by assessing the market reaction to each individual trade. We find that the pre-sell trades' excess returns are positive and significant. On the announcement date, share prices decrease, but, in the post trade period, they are mainly not significant, suggesting that insiders time their trades by selling when they know that the price of their IPO is stabilised with no more gains to achieve. In contrast, for the buy trades, we find significant negative excess returns in the preand post-event periods. While the buy trades of insiders in failing IPOs may be consistent with the price support hypothesis, 2 our results indicate that this aim is not achieved as the post-trade returns are not positive. Overall, our results suggest that insider trading is likely to be driven by the long-run performance of IPOs.
The analysis of insiders' trading patterns shows that the trades are not clustered around the lockup expiry dates; they are relatively evenly distributed across the 36 months sample period as the median number of years from the IPO date to the trading date is 1.45 years for both the Net Buy and Net Sell samples. When we split our sample period into two subsamples: months 2 to 18 and months 19 to 36, we show that the excess returns of Net Sell
IPOs are positive in the first period, but not significant in the remaining months, but for the Net Buy IPOs, they are negative in both sub-periods. Since at the time of the IPO investors cannot separate firms on the basis of subsequent insider trading, which, according to Hoque and Lasfer (2011) cannot be predicted even during the lockup period, we account for any look-ahead bias in our results by analysing the long-term returns from the trading rather than the IPO date. We find similar event study results, and the portfolio of Net Sell (Net Buy) IPOs earns positive (negative) alphas in the Fama-French calendar time 3-factor regressions. Our results imply that insiders respond to past performance and do not trade on insider information, although, in line with previous studies, they are contrarians, and Brennan and Cao (1997) argue that contrarian investors are likely to trade on insider information.
Why do insiders adopt such strategies? Our results could simply imply that, in line with the disposition effect in behavioural finance, insiders may exhibit a tendency to sell winners and hold on to losers for too long, because realising profits allows them to maintain self-esteem, but realising losses causes them to admit failure implicitly. While this may remain a possibility, we are not aware of other means of testing further this hypothesis. Instead, we provide alternative explanations for our results which may be specific to IPOs.
Huddart and Ke (2007) argue that the impact of insider trading depends on two fundamental factors: the precision of the insider's information and the level of uncertainty in the marketplace regarding the firm's value. We consider that, in the case of IPOs, there is great uncertainty about the value of the firm, and the information of insiders is likely to be less precise, resulting in low excess returns. This argument is likely to explain the behavior of stock prices around the buy trade which appears to be a weak signal, unlike that in seasoned firms. Nevertheless, we find that Net Buy IPOs perform better than No Trade IPOs, suggesting that the former IPOs could have had a worst performance without the buy trades of insiders. On the other hand, Net Sell IPOs are likely to have low information asymmetries as they perform well before the sell trades. Their signal is also weak as the post-trade returns are not negative, but the results suggest that these IPOs have reached their optimal valuation.
Our paper contributes to two main areas of research that are not so far considered conjointly: IPO long-run performance and insider trading. Although investors cannot predict at the time of the IPO the decision by insiders to trade, we show that these trades are affected by the IPOs' long-run returns, but not by the previously documented factors that affect the long-run returns such as underpricing (Morris, 1996; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001 ), overhang (Mikkelson et al., 1997) , reputation of underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990) , venture capitalist Gompers, 1997, Krishnan et al, 2011) , and private equity backing (Levis, 2011) . Our results may be specific to IPOs as they do not indicate that insider trading mitigates the information asymmetry as is the case for seasoned firms (See Korczak et al (2010) for recent review), and they also do not support Marin and Oliver (2008) who find that insiders sell up to 12 months before large monthly price drops, but buy one month before a large price jumps, and Jiang and Zaman (2010) who show that insiders' ability to predict future cash flow news, rather than their adoption of contrarian strategies, explains the predictive ability of their aggregate trades. Nevertheless, the behaviour of share prices in the pre-event period is consistent with the theoretical work of Cespa (2008) who shows that insiders are likely to trade on long-lived information and they control the flow of information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and sets up the hypotheses. Section 3 presents a discussion of our data and the methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical results, and the conclusions are in Section 5.
Review of the Literature and Hypotheses Tested

Review of the literature
In theory, IPOs are expected to generate positive long-term returns for a number of reasons. First, they are usually more risky than the average market, indicating a high exposure to market risk. 4 Second, the asymmetric models, particularly the signalling theories that relate the long-term performance to the first day returns, suggest that IPOs underprice on purpose to subsequently be able to sell further shares at a higher price, and as a result, the long-run returns should be high. If firms underprice to signal their high quality, they should perform better than low quality firms (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) . Similarly, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop a book building model under which underpricing compensates better-informed investors for truthfully revealing their information before the issue price is finalized, thus reducing the expected money left on the table. These investors may reveal a noisy signal, which indicates the direction and extent of the revision in the offer price relative to the price range, and may result in subsequent performance to correlate positively with the initial price revision.
The empirical evidence provided to date is mixed. Some studies report that IPOs underperform various benchmarks for the first few years after offering. Brav and Gompers (1997) report alpha from the regressions of Fama and French (1993) of -0.49. This underperformance is also observed in other countries (e.g., Schuster (2003) in Europe, and Levis (1993 , 2011 ), Espenlaub et al. (2000 ), and Goergen et al. (2007 in UK).
However, other studies show that this long-run underperformance depends on the sample period, statistical methodology, and may suffer from econometrics misspecifications.
Eckbo et al (2007) report significant underperformance of IPOs relative to matched firms of -18% for industrial IPOs using equally-weighted buy and hold returns, but when value-weighted returns are used, the difference is not significant. Similarly, Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) , and Eckbo and Norli (2005) report insignificant differences in buy and hold returns between IPOs and size and book-to-market matched control firms. They also report insignificant alpha based on variants of Fama and French (1993) Brav et al. (2000) find that post-issue IPO returns are similar to those of firms with similar size and book-to-market characteristics and they co-vary with similar non-issuing firms. Levis (2011) shows that, in the UK, while the equally weighted returns are not significant, the value weighted are negative and significant and the Fama and French (1993) coefficients are also not homogeneous across the equally-and value-weighted returns. He also shows significant positive performance for private-equity backed IPOs, but negative for non-backed IPOs.
Notwithstanding the methodological issues reviewed in Fama (1998) 6 and Ritter and Welch (2002), the past literature offered a number of explanations for the long-run underperformance of IPOs. Morris (1996 ), Ritter (1991 and Rajan and Servaes (1997) among others, argue that with costly short selling and heterogeneous beliefs among investors at the time of the IPO, investors are over-optimistic about the growth prospects of the company, resulting in initial overpayment. Aggarwal and Rivioli (1990) argue that there are fads in the IPO market as firms go public at the time when investors are over-optimistic about growth prospects of IPOs. As a result, the most optimistic investors will determine the price in the market. Subsequently, as more information becomes available and investor sentiment changes, they mark prices down. Ljungqvist (1996) argues that the greater the fraction of equity capital initial owners retain at floatation, the lower their incentive to take advantage of over-optimistic investors, since the value of their retained shares would fall as and when new investors become less optimistic, resulting in an increase in the long-run returns with the retention rate. Ritter (1991), Lerner (1994) , Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000) , Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001) extend these behavioural explanations and suggest that stock prices periodically deviate from fundamental values and managers and investment bankers take advantage of overpricing by selling stock to overly optimistic investors. Overall, under these arguments, the long-term returns emanate from high divergence of opinion raising the initial market price, and this disagreement declines over time, and the valuation by the marginal investor comes closer to that of the average investor.
Other studies relate the long-term returns to IPO fundamentals. For example, Eckbo et al. (2000) show that leverage is significantly reduced following equity offerings, while liquidity is increased, resulting in a reduction in risk. As a result, IPOs are less sensitive to interest and inflation shocks and require lower liquidity premium than benchmark firms, and thus, should have lower returns. Ibbotson (1975) reports a negative relation between initial returns at the IPO and the long-run share price performance. In terms of agency costs, Mikkelson et al. (1997) show that the long-run returns are unrelated to ownership structure, but Jain and Kini (1994) find a positive relation between post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by original shareholders. Other studies find that large IPOs (Brav et al., 2000) , backed by venture capitalists (Brav and Gompers, 1997) , or private equity firms (Levis, 2011) , and underwritten by prestigious underwriters (Carter et al., 1998 , Krishnan et al, 2011 underperform less, while those with wide initial spread, a late opening trade, and a high proportion of institutional flipping, have lower returns (Houge et al., 2001) . Carter et al (2011) show that IPO underperformance is limited to the 1980s and early 1990s.
In terms of insider trading, previous studies document that insiders are contrarians, but focus more on the association between insider trading and subsequent stock returns.
Seyhun (1986) shows that insiders are net buyers in small firms and net sellers in large firms and larger insider trades are associated with higher subsequent abnormal returns. Frankel and Li (2004) find that financial statement informativeness and analyst following reduces the impact of insider trade on subsequent returns. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that the impact of insider trading on stock returns is limited to small firms. Aboody and Lev (2000) use research and development (R&D) expenditure as a proxy for the information asymmetry between insiders and investors, to find a higher market reaction on the announcement date of insider trades for high R&D firms. Other studies that focus on individual insider trades also report that insider trading is informative and results in more efficient prices that reflect public as well as private information (e.g., Meulbroek (1992) , Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and Mcconnell, 1999) . However, Hubbart and Ke (2007) find only two measures of information asymmetries, R&D expenditures, and the median absolute abnormal return over past earnings announcements to affect the information content of insider trading, but not institutional ownership, analyst following, book-to-market ratio, and the frequency with which the firm reports losses. Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that stock-based compensation does not drive insider trading, and their results are consistent with portfolio rebalancing rather than the exploitation of private information. Clarke et al (2001) show that insider selling increases prior to seasoned equity offerings that are completed and cancelled, but declines afterward only for cancelled offerings, suggesting that insiders issue overvalued equity, and cancel the issue when the market reaction to the announcement eliminates the overvaluation.
As far as we know, no previous study focuses on the joint relationship between these two trends in the literature. We assess in this paper the link between insider trading and IPO long-run performance. We provide in the next section our hypotheses.
Testable Hypotheses
Overall, previous studies suggest that IPOs underperform because of high information asymmetries (Ritter and Welch, 2002) . Since other studies show that insider trading conveys information, we expect such trades to mitigate the information asymmetry inherent in IPOs, and thus, to affect the long-term performance of IPOs, for a number of reasons. Insiders are likely to trade prior to information releases and/or if their company is mispriced. The former is tightly regulated, but various studies show that insiders do trade before material information is released (e.g., Korczak et al., 2010) . We focus more on the second motivation as our concern is more on the long-term returns. We consider that when insiders have a higher information advantage, the abnormal return following their buy (sell) trades should be higher (lower). Given the great uncertainty about the value of their IPOs, insiders are likely to benefit from their trades if they hold perfect information, suggesting that insiders will only affect stock prices if they hold precise and credible information, and if outsides have lower information about the value of the IPO.
The second factor that might affect the impact of insider trading on the IPO performance is the level of competition in the market. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) develop the price-taking model where individuals can trade any amount without altering the price at which the trade takes place, while Kyle (1985) shows that, under imperfect competition, insiders will influence prices. Huddart and Ke (2007) argue that, in the case of insider trading, both these models predict that higher information asymmetry leads to more positive (negative) abnormal returns following buy (sell) trades, and, thus, higher returns to insiders.
In this paper, we expand this literature in several ways. We test the hypothesis that insider trading increases stock price accuracy and discovery in the long-run by mitigating the relatively significant information asymmetries inherent in IPOs, thus leading to a more efficient long-run pricing. We use Lakonishok and Lee's (2001) net purchase ratio, NPR, defined as net purchases over total transactions, as a measure of the aggregate insider trades in our IPOs. We expect NPR to explain further the long-run returns of IPOs. However, long-term performance could be the cause rather than the effect of insider trading. Previous studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005) assert that insiders are contrarian investors as they tend to buy (sell) after negative (positive) price performance.
If the post-trade returns do not revert, then we can conclude that the long-term returns that affects insider trading, rather than the reverse. We test this causality by analysing the average cumulative returns before their trades. The UK market is ideal for such analysis as insiders are required to inform their company and the market within a maximum of five days of trading, and such announcements are immediately disclosed in the Regulatory News Service.
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We, thus, expect IPOs where insiders sell (buy) to generate positive (negative) excess returns.
However, insiders may trade for other than private information reasons, such as liquidity and portfolio rebalancing considerations. In IPOs, they could also trade after lockup expiry date, but this will apply to only sell, not buy, trades. In this case, we expect weak or no relationship between insider trading and the long-run returns of IPOs.
Data and Methodology
We first gather the list of IPOs that went public in the London Stock Exchange, We extract any delisting dates, other accounting, and stock market data, which include daily stock prices and indices to compute the stock returns, market capitalization, which we use as proxy for size, accounting return on assets to measure profitability, and price-to-book ratio to proxy for growth from DataStream. We exclude 77 IPOs for which we could not find the prospectuses, 15 with missing share price data, and 195 with no lockup date or ownership data from the prospectuses. Our final sample includes 830 (74%) firms with complete data.
We obtain information on subsequent raising capital in the form of seasoned equity issues (SEOs) from London Stock Exchange, and then match it with our IPO sample to determine how many IPO firms raise more capital within three years of IPOs. We also obtain M&A announcement information from Thomson One Banker database. Then we match the M&A sample with out IPO data to determine how many of them occur during three years of IPOs.
Finally, we use a Fifth database, Directors' Deals, which records all the trades undertaken by insiders in the UK market. The database includes news items on directors' trades disclosed by all UK firms in the Regulatory News Service (RNS), such as transaction price, amount, and value, post-transaction holding, change in holding, name and position of the insider, and announcement and transaction dates. We exclude a number of observations not related to private information, such as exercise of options or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, awards made to directors under incentive plans or reinvestment plans. We also exclude all directors' transactions in investment companies. After this screening, we obtain 36,943 insiders' trades from the UK market. We check the data for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in announcement and transaction date is more than 5 days, the UK legal requirement (Korczak et al., 2010 353 (65%) with positive NPR, classified as Net Buy sub-sample. We use both number of transactions, NPR transaction, and value of the trades, NPR value. Overall, we expect insiders to be net buyers in over-performing and net sellers in underperforming IPOs.
We use various methodologies to test our hypotheses. We first use the standard event study methodology to compute the cumulative abnormal returns over 3 years after the first month of the IPO. The abnormal returns are the monthly returns on each IPO less the return on the Financial Times All Share Index, FTA, which is a more representative index as it includes small as well as large companies. We also use the AIM index for our AIM IPOs, and FTA for IPOs on the main market, and compute both the equally-and value-weighted CARs.
We also compute the style-adjusted CARs, and buy and hold returns, BHARs, following Ritter and Welch (2002) , as the difference between the returns on an IPO and a style-matched firm, defined as the closest market capitalization and book-to-market ratio listed firm to our IPO. We select the control firm only once, and if it is delisted prior to the IPO returns' ending date, we replace it with another matching firm on a point-forward basis. If the IPO is delisted, we compute the excess returns up to the date of delisting. We also use the market model to compute the abnormal returns over the event window [-40, +40] relative to the trading date, and the lockup expiry date. The α and β are from the regression of the security returns against the corresponding market indices, the AIM all share price 8 and FTA, for AIM and main market IPOs, respectively, over the period [-290, -41] 
where Rpt -Rft is the excess return over the risk free rate on a portfolio in time period t, RMtRft is the market risk premium, with FTA as a proxy for RMt, and Rft the 3 months Treasury bill rate. SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms, and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market return minus the return of the low book-to-market portfolio.
We extract the relevant data for size and book-to-market indices from K. French data library:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#International. We compute β of our firms as the sum of βt and βt-1. We use similar method to assess our firm's exposures to SMB and HML factors. Under the signalling and agency theory hypotheses, we expect αNet Buy to be higher than αNet Sell.
We also relate CARs to NPR after controlling for other factors defined in the previous literature, such as first day return, size, insider ownership (overhang), the underwriter reputation, venture capitalist backing, abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates, lockup length, period dummies, and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) to capture Myers and Majluf (1984) effects. In addition to the direct proxy for the actual takeover obtained from Thomson One Banker database, as discussed above, we follow Brar et al (2008) and define the takeover probability as follows. We first build a two-way matrix by size and growth in turnover. We consider that large and high growth firms are less likely to be subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a value of zero. In contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability of a takeover, and we assign them a value of one. We then classify firms in the remaining two quadrants into yield groups: high yield IPOs have a higher probability, and, thus take a value of one, while those with low yield have a value of zero.
Finally, we run logit regressions to determine the characteristics of the Net Sell and
Net Buy subsamples. In the first regression, the dependent variable is equal to one if IPO is in Net Sell sub-sample, and zero for No Trade. We next compare Net Buy and No Trade subsamples. The last regression compares the Net Sell and Net Buy sub-samples. We use various explanatory variables to capture the IPO fundamentals. We use size, as measured by the log of market value of equity at the IPO date, to assess whether insider trading occurs in large, thus, less risky firms. In addition, we include risk, as measured by the standard deviation of the stock returns over the 36-months period, and first day underpricing. We use market-tobook ratio, and CAR-40,-2 relative to trading dates, to assess whether insiders are contrarians.
We measure insider ownership structures using overhang, shares locked, and lockup lengths.
We also account for ownership of outsiders, including VC backing, and institutional holding.
Finally, we use takeover and SEO probabilities, to assess trading on insider information and prestigious underwriters to evaluate the impact of corporate brokers in the UK. and more than double that in the US, where, for example, Brav and Gompers (2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) find median of 180 days.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Our IPOs offered 38.6% (32.9%) of their shares in the market, the mean (median) shares locked amounts to 29.5% (24%) of the shares outstanding, and the level of underpricing of 22.5 % (9.5%) is consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Chambers and Dimson, 2009 ). The analysis of the fundamentals indicates that, while the average market value of equity of our firms is £140m (about $210m), our sample includes small as well as large firms. Consistent with US evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 2003) , our IPOs are loss making as the average (median) return on equity is -34.6% (-2.6%) and high growth as the average (median) marketto-book ratio is 3.88 (3.01).
Panels B and C report the distribution of the buy and sell trades during the three-year post-IPO period. On average, there are 3.56 sell and 4.38 buy trades, occurring roughly 1.5 years after IPO, suggesting that most of the trades occur after the lockup expiration date. The results indicate, however, that the number and value of shares sold are significantly higher than the buy trades; the value of shares sold of £2.3m is 10 times those bought of £0.23m. We also observe this difference (1.01% vs. 0.21%) when we scale the value of the trades by market capitalisation to account for size impact, as the average market value of IPOs subject to buy trades of £248m is significantly lower than the £538m for the sell trade IPOs. Overall, the buy trades are more frequent, but they are significantly smaller than the sell trades.
Consequently, the average holding of insiders is significantly larger in IPOs with sell trades.
Panel E reports the annual distribution of sample IPOs and the lockup lengths. [Insert Table 1 here] Table 2 reports the long-run performance over various sub-periods after the IPO date.
The long-run performance of IPOs
We first report in Panel A. the raw buy and hold average returns (BHARs). However, Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) argue that tests of underperformance based on buy-and-hold returns are biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no underperformance. Moreover, the raw equally-weighted returns may result in biased long-term returns as they are not compared to a benchmark and they may suffer from size effects. Furthermore, previous studies using matching firm approach find that the underperformance disappears (e.g., Brav
and Gompers, 1997) or, at least, it shrinks (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002) . We account for these potential biases by reporting, following Ritter and Welch (2002) Table 2 reports the cumulative abnormal returns over months 2 to 18, and 19 to 36 as Figure 2 shows that the periodicity of the 2,102 buy trades and 791 sell trades are relatively evenly distributed cross these two sub-periods.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Our results are relatively consistent across these different methodologies. Overall, they indicate that the excess returns are not homogeneous across our sample firms. In particular, the overall underperformance of our sample of IPOs appears to be driven by IPOs without insider trading and Net Buy IPOs which underperform consistently across all our sample period except the first few months of quotation, while Net Sell IPOs over-perform.
For example, the style-adjusted buy and hold excess returns (BHAR) reported in Panel B in months 19 to 36 amount to -22.6% and -20.4% for the sample as a whole and Net Buy IPOs, respectively, but -43.8% for IPOs with no insider trading. In contrast, the Net Sell IPOs generate positive returns throughout the sample period, except the first month. We show these results in Figure 1 . Overall, our results suggest that these trades are less likely to be informative, insiders are not trading on insider information, but they are likely to sell when their IPOs reached their peak, and/or to stop the positive performance of their firms.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here]
The timing of the excess returns
In this section, we assess whether the positive (negative) excess returns of Net Sell (Net Buy) IPOs occur before or after the trades of insiders. We assess directly the market reaction around each individual buy and sell trade undertaken by insiders. Table 3 , Panel A,
shows that on the announcement date of buy trades, share prices increase substantially by 3.59%, compared to the 1.16% reported by Fidrmuc et. al. (2006) for UK seasoned firms. In the various pre-event periods, the CARs are all negative and significant, suggesting that the trades occur when the IPO is underperforming. Interestingly, the post-event CARs are all negative, suggesting that the positive signal of the buy trades is short-lived. For the sell trades, the pre-event period CARs are positive and highly significant, but on the event and post-event periods, they are not constantly negative and significant. These results suggest that, consistent with previous insider trading literature (e.g., Seyhun, 1986), insiders adopt contrarian strategies by buying (selling) after significant share price decreases (increases), but the informativeness of these trades is weak, as stock prices do not increase (decrease) after their buy (sell) trades. Although the negative announcement dates abnormal returns implies that by selling shares insiders convey bad new to the market, in line with Brau and Fawcett (2006) , the impact is short lived. Our results also imply that since the returns in the period before the sell trades are positive, insiders may have stopped the positive performance of the IPO. Without such trades, returns may have carried on increasing, although they are small.
In Panel B, we aggregate these trades for Net Buy and Net Sell sub-samples. The
CARs for Net Buy sub-sample are all negative and significant, with the exception of the positive returns of 2.60% on the announcement dates. In contrast, for the Net Sell sample, the CARs are all positive, except for CAR-1,+1 and CAR+2,+40. However, the pre-trade CARs are relatively larger than the post-trade CARs, suggesting that, in line with the last two columns in Table 2 , the pre-trade period is likely to drive the excess returns for the Net Sell sample.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Fama and French (1993) Results
We expand our robustness checks using the Fama-French (1993) regressions model.
In line with Table 2 , we tested for robustness using various measures of excess returns. We report only a subset of these results as they are relatively similar. Our results so far may suffer from the look-ahead bias, because investors could not separate IPOs on the basis of subsequent insider trading at the time of the IPO. Such trading cannot be predicted even during the lockup period (Hoque and Lasfer, 2011). We, therefore, assess the excess returns from the date of the buy and sell trades, rather than IPO date, to allow investors to trade on such information. We run the Calendar time portfolio regressions.
The results in Table 4 , Panel C, show that alpha is negative for buy but positive for sell trades, confirming that insiders earn negative returns on their purchases, but shares prices do not decrease after sell trades, in line with the results in Panel A and Panel B.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The determinants of the long-run performance
The previous section indicates that insider trading affects significantly the long-run performance of IPOs as Net Sell (Net Buy) IPOs generate positive (negative) excess returns.
In this section, we expand these results by running a set of regressions to assess whether this difference in performance holds after controlling for IPO fundamentals. Table 5 Trade dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that IPOs not subject to insider trading underperform significantly more than their counterparts where insiders trade. These insider trading variables have also increased the explanatory power of the regressions as previous studies report relatively much lower R 2 of 1 to 8% (e.g., Levis, 2011; Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi, 2007) .
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Overall, our results suggest that insider trading is an additional and significant explanatory variable of the long-run performance of IPOs.
The remaining explanatory variables expand the findings reported in previous studies.
For example, the relationship between long-run performance and Underpricing is negative and significant in all our specifications, except in the Net Sell subsample, in line with previous evidence (e.g., Levis, 2011) , suggesting that IPOs with high first day returns generate lower long-term returns, in contrast to the predictions of the signalling models (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) . The variable Overhang is significant in (3) to (5), but not in (6) and in the subsample IPOs. The results also indicate that Prestigious Underwriters and the Venture Capitalists do not affect performance, in line with Levis (2011) , but in contrast to Krishnan et al (2011) . Size is negative, but not significant, in contrast to Brav and Gompers (1997) who show that underperformance is concentrated in small, non-venture capitalistsbacked firms. We also find a positive relationship between long-term returns and the lockup expiry dates excess returns, suggesting that IPOs with high abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates are more likely to have higher long-term returns, as insider are unlikely to have sold their holdings after the lockup, and, thus, lower agency conflicts. In addition, the Lockup Length, High Tech, Bubble and Hot market dummies, affect negatively the long-term returns.
Levis (2011) report a negative, but not significant, coefficient for bubble dummy.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The determinants of insider trading in IPOs
The results in the previous sections highlight the controversy that IPOs where insiders sell perform better that those where they buy. In this section, we expand this analysis by assessing the likelihood of insider trading through univariate analysis, and by running a set of logit regressions, in line with Hoque and Lasfer (2011) We use SEO dummy and takeover dummy to proxy for trading on news releases.
Trading on mispricing suggests that insider know the value of their company and, as a result, they tend to adopt contrarian strategies by buying (selling) stocks with poor (good) past performance (e.g., Jenter, 2005; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) . To capture this effect, we use the cumulative abnormal return 40 days before the trading dates, CAR-40,-2, and market-tobook ratio, to assess whether insiders buy a stock when it is selling at a low valuation, and sell it when it has a high valuation over a longer horizon.
However, other fundamental factors are also likely to affect such strategies. While Peress (2010) reports that firm size affects trading propensity, Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders are more likely to buy in small and sell in large firms. We use the natural logarithm of market capitalization, defined as the IPO offer price times the number of shares offered. In addition, previous studies also identified ownership as an additional factor that might affect the propensity of insiders to trade. For example, Ofek and Yermack (2000) These IPOs also generate higher returns before the trade and on the lockup expiry date, are high technology firms, but less likely to be issued in bubble period, and to be subject to a takeover. These results appear to suggest that insiders are likely to trade in low risk IPOs.
Interestingly, the results also suggest that prestigious underwriters and venture capitalists affect insider trading positively. Finally, consistent with the proposition that insiders do not trade on private information, the probability of insider trading is significantly lower in the IPOs with high takeover probability. likely to be high tech but less likely to be issued in hot period or to be taken over. They also generate relatively higher returns before the trades, CAR(-40,-2), but they have low market-tobook ratio, suggesting that they are likely to be undervalued. These results suggest that insiders sell in IPOs with relatively shorter lockup lengths and a smaller proportion of shares locked, but they appear do undertake their trades after the lockup expiry date, as the abnormal returns on that date are significantly lower than the remaining IPOs. In addition, they have the best underwriters, have low risk and generate highest returns, suggesting that the underwriters are likely to be happy for them to sell, as the usual negative signal of sell trades is likely to be small. In contrast, the Net Buy IPOs have strong underwriters, but more risky and generate low returns before the trade and their low market-to-book ratio suggest that they are undervalued. These results imply that insiders buy stocks probably to support the decrease in price. Contrary to Seyhun (1986), our results do not suggest that insider buy in small IPOs. Net Buy IPOs are relatively homogeneously distributed across these characteristics, but unlike
We then focus on differences between
Panel B reports the distribution of
Net Sell IPOs, they appear to occur more in IPOs quoted on AIM than on the Main Market.
[Insert Table 6 here] (1) and (2), we assess the probability that insiders are net sellers by comparing Net Sell IPOs, set equal to 1, against No Trade IPOs, equal to 0.
The results indicate that the pre-trade stock price performance affect significantly the decision to sell rather than not to trade, in line with previous insider trading literature (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Korczak et al., 2010) . The positive and significant coefficient of CAR (-40,-2) suggests that insiders sell in IPOs with significant increase in share prices, 38 trading days before the trade. These results are consistent with the notion that insiders adopt contrarian strategies in their sell trades. However, they appear to suggest that insiders are more concerned with the short-term run up in share prices rather than the long-term valuation of their IPO, as the coefficient of market to book, MB, is not significant. Insiders are also more likely to sell in large firms, and those backed by venture capitalists. Although these results suggest that insiders sell in less risky firms, the coefficient of the standard deviation of returns, σ, is negative and not significant. The coefficient of the takeover probability is negative and significant, suggesting that insiders are less likely to sell on private information for fear of litigation, political and reputational risks. In Equation (2), we report the results based on non-correlated variables, which are relatively similar, except that the coefficient of Prestigious Underwriters is now positive and significant.
Equations (3) and (4) (2005), and suggesting that insiders buy stocks if they consider that their firm is undervalued in the long-not short-run.
In addition, unlike Net Sell IPOs, firm size is positive but not significant. However, in line with the first two columns, the results indicate that insiders are less likely to buy when the probability of a takeover is high, probably to comply with the legal requirements.
Equations (5) and (6) report the probability of Net Buy vs. Net Sell. The results are relatively similar to the univariate findings in Table 5 . In particular, the CAR (-40,-2) Finally, Equation (7) reports the multivariate logit regression results where the dependent variable is equal to 2 for Net Sell, 1 for Net Buy, and 0 for No Trade IPOs. The results show that the pre-trade CARs are positive and significant, suggesting that these CARs are significantly higher for the Net Sell IPOs. These IPOs are also more likely to be backed by venture capitalists, and to be significantly larger than the other IPOs. In contrast, they have lower proportion of shares locked, lower probability of takeover and market-to-book ratio.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Conclusion
We find strong relationship between insider trading and the long-run returns of IPOs.
As far as we are aware, our paper is unique, as previous studies did not consider these two issues simultaneously. We show that UK IPOs underperform in the long-run, in line with previous UK and international studies, but those where insiders are net sellers generate substantial positive returns of 23.9% excess returns relative to size, and book-to-market matched firms, and their Fama and French (1993) alpha coefficients are constantly positive.
In contrast, IPOs where insiders are net buyers and/or are not subject to insider trading have negative returns. Our results hold when we use the event study methodology to analyse shortterm returns and the various methodologies to assess long-term returns, and when we account for all other factors that might affect the long-term returns in regression settings.
Our results may be consistent with the disposition effect developed in the behavioural finance literature, and they may also reflect the valuation uncertainty underlying IPOs. Since the excess returns are not negative after the sell trades, but they are negative in both the preand post-buy trade periods, our results imply that, unlike seasoned firms, the signalling role of insider trading in the case of IPOs is weak and that insiders time their trades and sell when they know that their IPO reached its peak, with no excess returns remaining, while they buy to support the price but the market does not value positively such trades. Our results suggest that in the context of IPOs, the signal of insiders is not likely to be too precise as the level of uncertainty in the marketplace regarding the value of the IPO is high. As a result there is no transfer of wealth from uninformed to informed investors. We also show that insider trading in IPOs is less likely to be driven by portfolio risk diversification as the propensity to trade is not affected by firm's risk, the buy (sell) trades do not necessary occur in small (large) firms, and that insider trading propensity is not affected by managerial ownership, unlike previous evidence of Meulbroek (2000) , Seyhun (1986) and Ofek and Yermack (2000) , respectively.
However, we are unable to assess further the disposition effect explanation because of lack of data and appropriate methodology. The data is also not available to assess further the information content of insider trading, the trading of insiders before news announcements, as in Korczak et al (2010) , the impact of private equity-backed IPOs, as in Levis (2011) , and the direct link between corporate brokers in the UK and trading by insiders, and the trading by insiders in the derivatives market to avoid the potential scrutiny by the regulators. The extent to which these factors will strengthen or alter our conclusions is a subject of further research. The table reports Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to assess long term performance of IPOs. Rpt -rft is the excess return over the risk free rate on a portfolio in time period t, RMt -Rft is the market risk premium in period t, SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms, and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market portfolio minus the return of the low book-to-market portfolio and Rft is the 3 months Treasury bill rate. We follow Ritter and Welch (2002) The dependent variable in the first two equations is a dummy equal to one for IPOs if insiders are net sellers (Net Sell, N = 190) and zero for no trade IPOs (No Trade, N = 287) . In the second two equations, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for IPOs if insiders are net buyers (Net Buy, N = 353), and zero for no trades (No Trade). In the last two equations, the dependent is dummy variable equal to one for Net Buy IPOs and zero for Net Sell IPOs. CAR (-40,-2) are the cumulative abnormal return over pre-event window. For the no trade sample, we measure the 39-day abnormal return as the abnormal return over the whole lockup period standardised to 39 days. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing price. Venture backed is dummy variable equal to one venture capitalist is present. Prestigious underwriter is a dummy equal to 1 if the IPO is underwritten by a global underwriter defined in Derrien and Kecskes (2007) . Lockup length is the log of the lockup period. Size is the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Shares locked is the number of shares locked over the holdings of insiders. Overhang is the ratio of shares retained to shares sold. Institutional Holding is the proportion of companies where institutions hold more than 3%. Takeover Probability is based on Brar et al (2008) We compute the Buy-and-hold returns relative to size and book-to-market control firms. We construct our samples as follows. We first select IPOs with insider trades (543 out of 830), which includes any IPOs with at least one insider trade during 36 months period after IPO. Then we compute the Net purchase ratio, NPR, as the difference between total value of purchases and sells, divided by total value of shares traded over this 36 months period after IPO. IPOs with positive (negative) NPR are classified as Net Buy (Net Sell) IPOs. We identify 190 Net Sell IPOs and 353 Net Buy IPOs. To remove the effect of first day return we compute the first month return without first day return.
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See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) , Ritter and Welch (2002), Ritter (2003) , and Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) for extensive reviews. As explained in the review of the literature section, the significance of these returns depends on the methodology used. We do not analyse underpricing and the behaviour of share prices on the lockup expiry dates (See, e.g., Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Hoque and Lasfer, 2011) . We use the returns on these dates and the first day returns as explanatory factors.
2
In general, underwriters can support prices by stimulating demand or by restricting supply in the aftermarket and in many countries temporary price support in IPOs is legal including the US (1934 Securities Act, Rule 10b-7, since replaced by Regulation M) and UK (Securities and Investment Board Rules, chapter III, Part 10). We do not have data to test for such trading by the underwriters.
3
See Subrahmanyam (2007) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a review. Kaustia (2004) argues that the disposition effect is clearly identifiable in the IPO market because the offer price is a common purchase price. He finds that when the stock price is below the offer price the volume is low, but the volume increases when the price surpasses the offer price for the first time, and when the stock achieves new maximum and minimum price, consistent with the reference price effect. This may apply mainly to periods closer to the IPO date, and we think that three years time may be too long to consider the offer price as a reference price. In addition, insiders might be anchoring on the price they initially receive their stock at which, unfortunately, is not available. There are many studies that document the negative long-run performance, including Ritter (1991), Loughran (1993) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Rajan and Servaes (1997) , Brav and Gompers (1997) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Teo, Welch, and Wong (1998) for the US market, Finn & Higham's (1988) for Australia, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) for Switzerland, and Keloharju (1993) for Finland. See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002) , and Ritter (2003) for extensive reviews.
6 Fama (1998) concluded that "the apparent (long run performance) anomalies are methodological illusions" (p 285). He argues that even little change to the methodology can change the empirical results. The UK Model Code prescribes much faster reporting of directors' dealings. The directors must inform their company as soon as possible after the transaction and no later than the fifth business day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf of their spouses and children (Hillier and Marshall, 2002) . In turn, the firm must inform the LSE without delay and no later than the end of the business day following receipt of the information. This implies that the information reaches the market as late as 6 days after transaction. In contrast, in the US, during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period, insiders have to report their trades on the 10th of the month following the transaction, resulting in a maximum delay of between 10 and 42 days, depending on the trading date. As a result, most previous studies could not analyse insider-trading event on or before the lockup expiry date.
8
As an alternative to AIM all share price index, we used the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index as the market index. Our results are qualitatively similar. for all firms of 8.45%. However, they report R 2 of 6.38% and 13.58% for small firms and large firms respectively.
11
See Korczak, et al. (2010) for a recent review and the specificities of the UK vs. US regulatory regimes and the difficulties in identifying what constitutes private information and an insider, and thus, the complexities in enforcing the insider trading rules. U.K. regulations prohibit trading by insiders who possess any price sensitive information, and insider trading is a criminal offence since the introduction of the Companies Act 1980. Unlike US, UK insiders are banned from trading in 'prohibited periods', which include 'close periods' of up to 60 days associated with earnings announcement, and any periods when there is 'any matter which constitutes inside information in relation to the company'. In addition, insiders have to get clearance from the chairman or a director designated in the company for this purpose, outside the 'prohibited periods' except for permissions to sell when an insider does not possess any inside information and has 'a pressing financial commitment that cannot be satisfied otherwise than by selling the relevant securities of the company'.
